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Abstract
Consolidation in the agricultural biotechnology industry can both enhance
and dampen market competition. This report examines the causes and con-
sequences of industry consolidation and its effect on market efficiency.  In
some cases, concentration realizes economies of scale, which can improve
market efficiency by driving down production costs. The protection of
intellectual property rights is integral to the agricultural biotechnology
marketplace, stimulating research and development, investment, and the
development of substitute markets. However, excessively broad intellectual
property rights can hinder the market for innovation. Recent data on merg-
ers, acquisitions, and strategic collaborations in the agricultural biotech-
nology industry, as well as the emergence of “life science” conglomerates,
indicate some level of consolidation. However, the move by some compa-
nies to divest their seed operations calls into question the long-term viabil-
ity of these conglomerates.
Keywords: industry concentration, consolidation, biotechnology, market
efficiency, market power, intellectual property rights, agricultural input
industries, mergers, acquisitions. 
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Number 763Recent innovations in genetic science and agricultural
biotechnology have created commercial seed varieties
that promise higher yields, reduced input use, and other
desirable new properties. Adoption of genetically engi-
neered seed and complementary farming techniques has
rapidly become widespread.  
However, investments in biotechnology are often risky,
expensive, and long-term. Partially in response to the
risk and cost associated with agricultural biotechnology
research and development (R&D), recent years have
witnessed consolidation in agricultural industry R&D,
and the formation of so-called "life science" companies
that apply biotechnology to both pharmaceutical outputs
and agriculture.  However, the emergence of "life sci-
ence" companies in many cases has been followed
quickly by divestiture of their agricultural biotechnology
interests. 
This report begins with a summary of the economic
causes and consequences of industry consolidation.
Industry consolidation resulting in highly concentrated
agricultural input markets can erode competition, lead-
ing to inefficient markets and to higher prices paid both
by "downstream" purchasers of inputs and by con-
sumers. However, industry consolidation is not neces-
sarily inefficient: in certain circumstances, the economic
benefits of consolidation can outweigh the effects of the
potential decrease in competition.
Another focus of this report is the special relationship
between concentration and technological change.
Technological leaders with successful R&D projects can
take control of a market segment for a limited time by
offering new or improved products.  
An advantage gained through successful R&D can be
maintained as long as a technological leader can stay
ahead of the competition, sometimes with protection
from intellectual property rights such as patents and
plant variety protection certificates (PVPCs).  In some
cases, the economic drawbacks of concentrated, non-
competitive markets are compensated by the long-term
productivity growth associated with technological
change.  
Finally, this report examines recent consolidation behav-
ior in the U.S. seed industry as a case study, using a
sample of U.S. seed industry mergers, acquisitions, and
strategic collaborations to illustrate the short-term fac-
tors behind consolidation and the possible effects on
agricultural biotechnology R&D.  Because of the rapid
pace of technological change and industry consolida-
tion, the U.S. seed industry has the potential to illustrate
changes in industry structure arising from these two
forces.  
For example, recent data on industry consolidation in
the U.S. market for seed and related agricultural inputs
feature the emergence of "life science" conglomerates,
large companies able to apply investments in R&D to
both agricultural and pharmaceutical applications.
However, subsequent divestiture calls the long-term via-
bility of these conglomerates into question.  
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Concentration and Technology in
Agricultural Input Industries
IntroductionConcentration in any industry is a concern when market
power hinders the efficient operation of markets. For
instance, a dominant firm with market power can raise
the prices it charges consumers without fear of being
undercut by competitors. A firm with market power
might also be able to drive down the prices it pays sup-
pliers, reducing suppliers' profits and distorting their
incentives to produce. But industry concentration may
also have positive economic benefits, including
economies of scale and other effects.
Concentration can negatively affect market
efficiency. An efficient market is one in which buyers
and sellers arrange transactions whenever a transaction
exists that will benefit both parties. When industry con-
solidation reduces the number of buyers or sellers to the
extent that the remaining market is concentrated, the
remaining buyers or sellers can gain a measure of mar-
ket power.  They can use their market power to limit
some mutually beneficial trades, distorting prices in
their favor. 
For example, a firm that limits output to increase prices
higher than a competitive market would bear drives
some buyers out of the market. The firm could have
supplied these buyers at a lower price and still achieved
a profit, potentially benefiting both buyer and seller.
But the firm refuses to expand the market, preferring
instead to maintain the high prices it charges to remain-
ing buyers. 
In a different example, concentration of buyers of inputs
might reduce the prices they pay to suppliers.  Without
the pressure of competing buyers to bid up prices, sup-
pliers must take the lower prices for their products.
However, low prices reduce industry supply and force
some suppliers to switch into other industries or reduce
output to more efficient levels.  Again, price distortions
of market power eliminate some volume of mutually
beneficial transactions.
In addition, the absence of vigorous competition lessens
the pressure on producers to make efficient use of
resources. As a result, market power arising from indus-
try concentration can increase production costs, reduc-
ing aggregate economic efficiency. 
Concentration raises concerns about market equity
or "fairness." In addition to price distortions that create
market inefficiency, market power due to industry con-
centration can reallocate the benefits of market transac-
tions. Of course, buyers and sellers who are forced out
of a market by price distortions lose the chance to make
beneficial trades, so the total economic value of a mar-
ket decreases. But market power also redistributes the
economic benefits of transactions that do take place.
Firms with market power capture a greater share of the
economic value of a market; consumers typically bear
the burden, paying higher prices for goods of lower
quality (fig. 1).
Industry concentration can have positive effects as
well. Despite the decreased potential for competition,
sometimes markets are more efficient with fewer suppli-
ers. For instance, some industries are characterized by
economies of scale, meaning that average costs of pro-
duction decline as quantities increase. In other words, it
is more efficient to have a few firms operating at high
outputs than to have many firms producing a smaller
market share.  In such cases, the lowest cost of produc-
tion is achieved in large amounts, and the most inexpen-
sive organization of production to meet market demand
involves a small number of very large firms. When com-
petition is vigorous despite the small number of market
participants, the risk of market power is lessened, and
there are gains in efficiency because fewer firms incur
fixed costs. 
Market power can be held in check by the threat of
new competitors. An important limitation to market
power in any industry is the threat posed by potential
new competitors. Price distortions and market inefficien-
cy can be an incentive for new competitors to enter a
market, meeting demand more efficiently. The threat of
entrants can enforce market discipline, preventing firms
in a concentrated industry from maintaining high prices
because of the competition they might attract. In addi-
tion, markets for new products can arise over the long
term, offering a substitute for the products supplied by
concentrated, noncompetitive industries. 
Market efficiency depends on the level of market com-
petition, not the number of competitors.  Market con-
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Positive and Negative Aspects of Concentrationcentration does not always imply market power.  The
presence of only a few buyers or sellers in a market
does not mean that those market participants are not
competitive. 
On the other hand, the existence of many firms does not
always imply adequate competition: if markets are high-
ly segmented (for instance, geographically), many firms
could each have inordinate market power in the market
segment they control. And while market efficiency and
equity may suffer when industries consolidate and
become concentrated, industry consolidation can be an
appropriate response to realize economies of scale or
offset declining demand. 
Furthermore, entry by new competitors and the develop-
ment of substitute products pose important checks
against the exercise of market power.  
As a result, determination of the underlying causes of
industry concentration is only possible with detailed,
case-by-case analysis. 
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Figure 1—Economic effects when a concentrated industry restricts output1
Source: Varian, 1999.
1 When market power allows one or more dominant firms to raise the price above a competitive level (from Pc to Pmp), the quantity
exchanged in the market decreases (from Qc to Qmp).This lost quantity of transactions is the magnitude of market inefficiency
caused by market power, the volume of mutually beneficial transactions that do not take place. The value of these lost transactions,
called the "dead weight loss," is equal to the roughly triangular shaded region.This region is composed of benefits lost to consumers
and profits lost to producers. However, the higher price under market power reallocates some remaining market benefits from con-
sumers to producers, represented by the dark rectangular region. In this example, producers profit from market concentration and
consumers receive less output and pay higher prices. When buyers have market power, producers typically receive low prices and
benefits are shifted to buyers. In either case, price distortions tend to reduce the aggregate amount of economic activity.
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pmpIntellectual property rights restrict the number of suppli-
ers in a market in order to provide incentives for innova-
tion.  Examples of intellectual property protection
instruments are patents for inventions, copyrights for lit-
erary and artistic works, and plant variety protection
certificates (PVPCs) for desirable plant traits.   Because
intellectual property rights restrict market entry, they
result in concentrated, protected markets.  However,
market power arrived at through intellectual property
protection preserves incentives for investment in new
products and technologies that are otherwise easily
copied.   
Imitation of new technologies and creations is usually
cheaper and quicker than inventing them anew, so tech-
nology leaders without intellectual property protection
would be forced to compete against entrants with lower
average costs. Entrants could charge lower prices and
drive a technological leader out of the industry with his
or her own creations. If firms refuse to invest in R&D
under these circumstances, this creates a market failure
in the development of new technologies and product
improvements.  Since long-term economic growth and
productivity gains depend in part on technological inno-
vation, intellectual property rights are an important safe-
guard against this market failure.
Intellectual property protection sacrifices short-term
market efficiency for long-term gains. By preventing
the entry of imitators and competitors, intellectual prop-
erty protection actually encourages inventors to exert
market power. A patented product shields its owner
from competition and allows the patent holder to charge
prices higher than an efficient, competitive market
would allow in the short term.   The resulting industry
might not operate efficiently, in the sense that buyers
and sellers could find more mutually beneficial trades
but for the price distortions of concentration.  In addi-
tion, the institutions that assign, monitor, and defend
intellectual property rights are costly to support.
But the potentially large profits associated with this
product are a necessary economic incentive to reward
risky investment in its development.  In the long term,
the economy benefits from the discovery and invention
of new products and product improvements. In relation
to the earlier discussion of checks on concentration,
intellectual property rights prevent the entry of new
competitors but encourage the development of substitute
markets.  In essence, intellectual property rights consti-
tute a bargain in which society tolerates short-term mar-
ket inefficiency for long-term gains in quality and pro-
ductivity.
An important role of intellectual property rights is to
create a market for innovation. Firms with important
intellectual property assets do not necessarily possess
the complementary assets, commercial skills, or market
presence necessary to bring their products to market. In
some cases, the difficulty and complexity of innovation
might require inventors to focus on their scientific and
technological expertise rather than on the entrepreneur-
ial skills necessary to successfully market the resulting
products. Intellectual property rights provide inventors a
negotiating tool with which to license or sell an inven-
tion to established firms better positioned to commer-
cialize it. 
Excessively broad intellectual property rights can
inhibit the market for innovation. Government author-
ities are responsible for defining the limits of intellectu-
al property rights. For example, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office examines U.S. patents and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture administers PVPCs. In some
cases, intellectual property rights for two different par-
ties may overlap, which could lead to litigation. Strong
intellectual property rights might also hinder innovation
if granted on a "research tool" or fundamental technolo-
gy necessary for future improvements. 
While intellectual property rights can be licensed to
other parties, owners of these kinds of intellectual prop-
erty rights might refuse to grant licenses for strategic
reasons (e.g., to prevent a competitor from "inventing
around" a market position). The problem compounds in
areas of rapid and complex research in which many
licenses might be necessary for further improvements,
because the owner of any one of them could hold up
further research. Coping with these potential problems
with intellectual property rights can raise transaction
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Concentration and Intellectual Propertycosts in the market for innovation, reducing the level of
investment in beneficial technologies and product
improvements.
Firms with intellectual property are sometimes pur-
chased outright. Intellectual property rights give firms
the ability to license their innovations while retaining
control over them. However, firms can also be pur-
chased outright as a means to acquire their intellectual
property assets. This might be an especially expedient
solution to the "hold up" problem when several intellec-
tual property rights conflict. Acquisition of intellectual
property in this way can contribute to industry concen-
tration, with undesirable effects for short-term market
efficiency. However, this is also one part of the process
by which industries reorganize (and potentially consoli-
date) in order to realize the long-term economic value of
innovations.
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try in the 1990's was rapid consolidation as smaller seed
companies and plant-breeding operations were pur-
chased by large agricultural concerns.  Between 1995
and 1998, approximately 68 seed companies either were
acquired by or entered into joint ventures with a handful
of large multinational corporations (fig. 2).  Moreover,
some of the acquisitions and combinations involved
companies that had previously undertaken acquisitions
of their own.
Several factors may have accounted for consolidation in
the seed industry. Prior to seed company acquisitions,
the core businesses of most of these large, acquiring
corporations consisted of either pharmaceutical or
chemical products.  The sale of chemical units during a
period of relative stagnation in that industry during the
1980's freed up capital for diversification into new
industries, through R&D or the acquisition of existing
companies.   
Meanwhile, biotechnology startup firms emerged in the
1980's to commercialize recent advances in molecular
biology. Commercialization of molecular biology
required understanding of both chemical and biological
processes. More recent advances in genomics, the assay
of genetic traits in plants and animals, reinforced this
trend. Implementation of these techniques in agriculture
relied on plant breeding operations, but also on chemical
inputs to agriculture such as herbicides, pesticides,
fungicides, and fertilizers. 
For chemical companies already involved in agriculture,
seed companies were logical acquisitions because of
complementarities between their chemical inputs and
new genetically engineered traits (e.g., herbicide resist-
ance).  The combination of R&D in novel biotechnology
techniques in pharmaceutical and agricultural applica-
tions by firms with prior experience in industrial chemi-
cals and other agricultural inputs prompted discussions
of an emerging "life sciences" industry.
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Concentration and Technology Issues in the U.S. Seed Industry
Figure 2—Seed company acquisitions by life science firms, 1995-1998
Monsanto  22





Source: Brennan et al., 1999.Acquisition of smaller plant-breeding operations gave
the larger firms quick access to a stock of cultivars and
new varieties still in development, capital equipment
necessary for increased plant-breeding efforts, and other
important assets.  Acquisition also represented an effi-
cient means of obtaining the smaller firms' intellectual
property and know-how, much simpler than replication
or "inventing around" it.
Despite these possible rationales for buying up seed
companies, four "life science" corporations announced
plans to divest their seed operations almost before the
mergers and acquisitions that created them were com-
plete. There were several possible explanations for the
divestitures. For example, anticipated research synergies
may have failed to develop. Since success in research in
complex technologies depends on coordinated work by
many researchers, the larger scale of R&D in the con-
solidated companies might have diminished the enthusi-
asm of pharmaceutical executives for operations in a
new industry with specific research challenges. 
Concerns over consumer acceptance of genetically engi-
neered crops in the United States and elsewhere raised
uncertainty about the profitability of advances in agri-
culture and concern about the potentially damaging
effects on reputation associated with a potentially
unpopular product, despite regulatory approval. For
example, British retailers Safeway and Sainsbury
removed genetically modified tomatoes from shelves in
UK stores in 1998.  The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency cited possible allergenicity concerns, leading to
a recall of Aventis StarLink corn.
Finally, Federal regulatory and antitrust scrutiny of
mergers affecting market concentration was another
concern. When a biotechnology breakthrough in a par-
ticular crop has the potential to increase sales substan-
tially, its acquisition by a market leader might lead to
Federal antitrust investigation and subsequent action.
Figure 3 shows a measurement of industry concentration
called the "Four-Firm Concentration Ratio," the percent-
age of market share controlled by the four largest firms.
With market concentration already at historically high
levels for some major U.S. crops, leading firms might
have encountered a disincentive for the acquisition of
agricultural biotechnology firms were it to result in fur-
ther consolidation. 
Several of the largest "life science" firms made recent
announcements that might further change industry struc-
ture. (See box, "Events Between December 1999 and
Early February 2001.") The information below is current
through early February 2001, based on news articles and
company press releases.  Due to the rapid pace of devel-
opments in the biotechnology research industry, the rel-
evance of the following information can be expected to
change over time.
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Events Between December 1999 and Early February 2001
Pharmaceutical Megamergers 
- Novartis attempts unsuccessfully to acquire American Home Products, which in turn unsuccessfully bid for
Warner-Lambert.  
- Pfizer wins the bidding contest for a merger with Warner-Lambert in February 2000. 
Divestiture of Agricultural Divisions
- AstraZeneca, Novartis, and American Home Products, which collectively controlled about 26 percent of the
$39 billion global agricultural market, each place their agricultural divisions for sale to concentrate on core
pharmaceutical businesses.
- Aventis plans to spin off Aventis CropScience, raise capital through an initial public offering, and rename the
entity Agreva by the end of 2001. (See also "Further Consolidation," below.) 
Monsanto Restructured, Acquired
- A new company called Pharmacia is formed by the merger of Monsanto and Pharmacia and Upjohn, with
60,000 employees, a $2 billion annual pharmaceutical R&D budget, and $17 billion estimated sales and $50
billion market capitalization in 1999.
- An autonomous agricultural subsidiary, headquartered in St. Louis, retains the Monsanto name. 
- Monsanto is to sell nearly 20 percent of its agricultural division in an initial public offering.  
- Monsanto cancels a $1.9 billion deal to buy Delta and Pine Land, a deal that would have significantly
increased their combined market share of cotton seed sales.  
Further Consolidation
- Novartis and AstraZeneca announce a plan to spin off their farm products operations, worth $5.3 and $2.5
billion, respectively, to jointly form a new, separate entity (dedicated exclusively to agriculture) to be known as
Syngenta.  
- Syngenta would be the world's largest agricultural products business, with over $7 billion in annual sales,
moving ahead of Aventis. 
Depressed Market and Few Buyers for Agricultural Divisions 
DuPont and Dow (which bought Union Carbide to become the number two chemical company after DuPont)
have made no attempt to date to divest their agricultural divisions. However, they now have limited options
since, if they were to attempt to reverse course, few buyers exist to purchase agriculture divisions.    
-  An exception is the acquisition of American Cyanamid by BASF, which acquired the agricultural chemicals
unit from American Home Products in June 2000.To explore concentration in agricultural inputs in greater
detail, this report analyzes a sample of data assembled
from Nature Biotechnology reports on mergers, acquisi-
tions, and strategic collaborations in the biotechnology
industry, especially agricultural biotechnology. Brennan
et al. (1999) collected the sample. Nature Biotechnology
reports primarily on scientific advances in both pharma-
ceutical and agricultural biotechnology, but also moni-
tors the business and regulatory environment of the
industry. Announcements of mergers, acquisitions, and
strategic alliances between R&D entities in biotechnolo-
gy are reported in a section entitled "Business and
Regulatory News." 
The sample is illustrative of concentration activity in
agricultural biotechnology. However, it is not a compre-
hensive study of all collaborations and acquisitions in
the industry. First, not all preliminary activities
announced were actually carried through to fruition,
even though they were reported in the data. More
importantly, the sample consists of deals deemed by the
editorial staff at Nature Biotechnology to have a particu-
lar interest to its readership. This probably biases the
sample in some way, for example, giving special atten-
tion to arrangements involving one or more exceptional-
ly large firms and underrepresenting the entire scope of
activity in the industry. Also, the sample understates the
total number of mergers, acquisitions, and strategic
alliances that occurred in the industry. Nevertheless, the
sample captures a large number of mergers, acquisi-
tions, licensing arrangements, and strategic collabora-
tions from which to infer patterns about consolidation in
the agricultural biotechnology industry.
Concentration can arise through many different types of
business activities.  Perhaps the simplest form to consid-
er is when a firm acquires assets from another firm in
the same industry, leading to greater production capaci-
ty, sales, and market share for the acquiring firm.  In
some cases, this can result in market power and weak
competitive pressure.  However, concentration can occur
through more indirect business relationships as well.
Contractual agreements covering aspects from produc-
tion to sales can increase effective concentration in an
industry.  The ultimate effect on concentration depends
on factors such as industry structure and the exact
nature of business relationships between companies.
Using the Brennan et al. (1999) data set, this section
examines the most prevalent forms of business relation-
ships found in the recent consolidation of the U.S. seed
industry.
Acquisitions of Existing Businesses and
Business Units
The sample included observations of several distinct
types of new business activities and relationships. By
far, the most commonly observed activity occurred
when one firm acquired another—238 of 381 observed
strategic collaborations involved a transfer of equity
ownership of existing businesses or business units. At
least 200 of these were outright acquisitions in which
100 percent of ownership equity changed hands.
Approximately 15 other observations involved the trans-
fer of at least a 50-percent stake in the acquisition tar-
get.  Whether these acquisitions have significantly
increased concentration in the U.S. seed industry is dif-
ficult to determine, since the acquired firms represent
different aspects of seed production in various crops and
growing regions.  However, the number and value (fig.
4) of transactions clearly indicate that significant change
in the ownership of assets is taking place.
Mergers. About 20 observations were identified as
mergers. Mergers accounted for three of the deals val-
ued at over $1 billion identified in the sample. These
three mergers were: the 1996 merger of Novartis with
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz Chemicals ($63.7 billion), the
1998 merger that created AstraZeneca ($35 billion), and
the 1989 merger of Bristol Meyers with Squibb ($11.5
billion). These blockbuster deals contained significant
involvement with the pharmaceutical sector.
Joint Ventures. Twenty-six observations were identified
as joint ventures. Research joint ventures can result in
the development of new products to compete with exist-
ing ones, reducing market power.  However, joint ven-
tures can stifle competition as well.  For example, a
dominant firm could use a joint venture to co-opt a
potential competitor.  At the same time, joint ventures
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Mergers, Acquisitions, and Strategic Collaborations 
in Agricultural Biotechnologyare a flexible way for two firms to collaborate on a
potentially promising avenue of research while main-
taining control of their respective organizations.
The most common form of joint venture in the sample
resulted in a new research enterprise controlled equally
by its founders. Joint ventures are a form of industrial
organization well suited to biotechnology: parties
engaging in expensive and risky research projects bene-
fit from sharing risk with a venture partner, and the dif-
ficulty and complexity of innovations encourage firms
to find partners with complementary expertise. 
Licenses. Licenses are an extremely important business
relationship among firms in the agricultural biotechnolo-
gy sector. Licenses give firms greater access to patented
technology, in exchange for a licensing fee, royalty, or
some other consideration. Not only does the exchange
of technology through licenses promote the diffusion of
useful technology and enable the development of further
innovation, but licensing fees paid to the owners of
patented technology provide another way for firms to be
rewarded for successful research and development. 
Although many different licensing agreements can be
negotiated, the distinction between exclusive and nonex-
clusive licenses is particularly important in a discussion
of industry concentration. When a firm acquires a
nonexclusive license, it gains permission to use the
patented technology. When a firm acquires an exclusive
license, it also secures a promise that the owner of the
technology will not license it to other parties. Exclusive
licenses might impede the diffusion of technologies that
can result in further innovation and the development of
competing products.
Collaborations, Research Agreements, and
Research/Strategic Alliances. The differences between
collaborations, agreements, and alliances reported in the
sample are not immediately obvious. Some of them
probably represent self-identified nomenclature describ-
ing roughly the same thing as a joint venture, creating a
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Figure 4—Share of mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances in the U.S. seed industry, by
value, 1980-1998


















6%jointly owned research enterprise. Other agreements
probably involve sharing of resources and personnel for
the purpose of accomplishing a specific research goal.
Concentration of Business Activities 
Just 10 firms accounted for almost half of the observed
mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and strategic
alliances reported in the sample (table 1). The 10 firms
with the most activity were involved in 186 of the 382
observations in the sample, a further indication that
some consolidation has taken place in the industry.
Moreover, Monsanto (with 37 deals) successfully
acquired the remaining 60 percent of outstanding shares
in DeKalb Genetics (with 11 deals) in 1998; Empresas
La Moderna (with 16 deals) merged with DNA Plant
Technology (an active research concern with distribution
channels through Bionova); the firm Aventis was formed
from a combination of AgrEvo and Rhone-Poulenc; and
a new company called Syngenta was formed when
Novartis and AstraZeneca (itself the product of an earli-
er merger) divested and combined their agricultural
units. These developments further increased the concen-
tration of strategic alliances.
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Table 1—Consolidation activity for 10 most active biotechnology firms, 1998
Source: Brennan et al., 1999
Company Mergers Acquisitions Joint Ventures Other Total
Monsanto (USA) 1 15 4 17 37
AgriBiotech (USA) 1 30 0 5 36
Novartis (Switz.) 3 21 1 0 25
AgrEvo/Aventis (Germany) 2 15 3 2 22
AstraZeneca (UK) 0 14 1 1 16
Limagrain (France) 0 15 0 1 16
Empresas La Moderna/Savia (Mex.) 1 10 0 5 16
Rhone-Poulenc Agro (France) 3 6 2 2 13
DuPont (USA) 0 3 2 8 13
DeKalb Genetics (USA) 0 11 0 0 11Consolidation in the U.S. commercial seed industry pro-
vides an opportunity to examine issues related to con-
centration and technological change.   While the data
presented in this report are insufficient to make final
determinations about the extent of concentration in the
industry, they do shed interesting light on several rele-
vant policy areas.
Consolidation leading to concentration and market
power is important because of the tendency to erode
competition.  Competitive markets are an important
incentive for efficient aggregate production, and prevent
distortions that result in inequitable allocation of eco-
nomic benefits.  
Aside from the magnitude of consolidation, another
interesting aspect to consider is the diversity of business
relationships and strategic alliances that have emerged.
Although mergers and acquisitions were most common,
firms found it advantageous to negotiate more sophisti-
cated arrangements as well: licenses, joint ventures,
contract research agreements, etc.  These arrangements
can potentially restrict competition as easily as more
obvious forms of consolidation.  
However, it is likely that other aspects of the competi-
tive environment in which these firms operate influence
the types of arrangements that are ultimately negotiated.
It is possible that some arrangements were motivated by
an attempt to work around intellectual property protec-
tion: through licensing agreements, outright acquisition
of firms with intellectual property rights, establishment
of joint ventures, etc., when licensing deals could not be
made.
Both consolidation and the formation of diverse and
complex business arrangements occur against a back-
drop of rapid technological change.  The "life science
conglomerate" is one business model that was created to
quickly incorporate technological advances into new
products.  Despite the continued existence of large cor-
porations with significant research experience in phar-
maceutical, agricultural, and chemical applications, the
divestiture of agricultural units (Monsanto from
Pharmacia, Syngenta from AstraZeneca and Novartis,
etc.) signals that the industry will take a different tack in
the future.
Another influence of technological change on seed
industry structure is the nature of new business relation-
ships forged between companies.  While some of the
largest firms in the industry have sought mergers, they
have also acquired or contracted with small startup firms
with promising R&D projects.  Small firms have also
negotiated strategic alliances between themselves.  The
choice of business relationships probably reflects an
effort on the part of companies to share risks and
rewards from research in complex technologies.
A final point about the role of technological change and
industry structure is that technology, and the industry
response to technology, affects not only present compet-
itive circumstances but also the new markets in which
firms will compete in the future.
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